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Geoffrey Duckworth*

The Impact of "Charter Values" and
Campbell v Jones: Is It Now Easier
To Establish Qualified Privilege Against
Defamation?

Introduction
The purpose of this case comment is to impel a discourse on whether
Campbell v. Jones' has "loosened the test" on qualified privilege. In the
aftermath of the Court of Appeal decision, it might be tempting to suggest
that Campbell v. Jones means that the defence of qualified privilege is
being re-fabricated in light of the advent of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, in order to take an expanded account of "Charter values"
such as freedom of expression. This case comment adopts the contrary
view, and asserts that what Campbell has really done is clarify exactly
which type of extraordinary circumstances will found an occasion upon
which a court will recognize qualified privilege in relation to a defamatory
communication made to the "world at large." In other words, Campbell
should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the traditional principles
of qualified privilege and the pre-Charter jurisprudence.
In Campbell, three twelve-year-old black girls at a Halifax elementary
school were subjected to a very invasive and humiliating personal
search in full view of windows to which other students had access-over
having taken a ten-dollar bill. During the search, there were egregious,
multiple violations of rights, and almost immediately thereafter, a storm
of controversy erupted in a community notoriously beset by long-term
systemic discrimination. Soon after, two lawyers retained to help lodge
a complaint with the Halifax Police Department over the illegal search
alleged in a press conference that race and class were linked to the rights
violations, and claimed that the search would not have occurred against
white children. The police officer who had conducted the search filed suit
for defamation. Overturning the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that
the statements were made on an occasion of qualified privilege because,
on the facts, the lawyers had a "substantial and compelling" public duty
to make honestly and reasonably believed comments to a community
2
suffering from systemic racism.

*
Geoffrey Duckworth is currently completing an LL.M. at Osgoode Hall Law School and is also
a student-at-law at the law firm of Prouse, Dash & Crouch, LLP in Brampton, Ontario. Geoffrey may
be reached at <gduckworth@prousedash.ca>.
1. [2002] N.S.J. No. 450 (C.A.) (QL), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2003) S.C.C.A. No. 543
[Campbell].
2.
Campbell, supra note I at para. 101. The facts of the case are discussed in greater detail below
in the context of the jurisprudence on qualified privilege.
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In order to appreciate the contribution that Campbell has made, it is
necessary to establish that qualified privilege does not, strictly speaking,
involve a balancing of the general freedom of expression against the
reputation of an individual, in contrast to what one court has asserted in a
decision subsequent to Campbell.' In fact, the general freedom ofexpression
is balanced directly against the reputation of the individual only at the
point where the court is deciding whether there was defamation. Qualified
privilege becomes an issue once defamation has been established. At such
a point a court has, in essence, already determined that the harm done to
the reputation of the injured plaintiff outweighs the general freedom of
expression. The question then becomes whether there was an occasion
upon which the defendant guilty of defamation had a public duty or a
private interest in making the particular communication to the third party.
If so, qualified privilege attaches to that occasion-it does not attach
to the communication or to the party making the communication. It is
the occasion that defines the scope of the privilege and the scope of the
communication that will be protected, and it is this occasion that must be
balanced against the reputation of the individual when a court is deciding
upon whether to recognize the existence of privilege.
It is only in this context that the contribution of Campbell may be
properly appreciated. Campbell demonstrates that not all occasions are
created equal, and also illustrates the conditions under which a court will
allow a reputation to be defamed. Thus I begin with a brief canvass of the
relevant history and parameters of the common law defence of qualified
privilege. After having parsed the historical development and basic
elements of the defence, I will demonstrate that qualified privilege attaches
to particular occasions of public duty or private interest, and that because of
this, it is properly the occasion that must be weighed against the reputation
of the individual.4 Next, this comment will establish that "Chartervalues"
have not altered this and do not necessitate a reconstruction of defamation
law. Finally, I will contend that Campbell has not made it easier to establish
qualified privilege, but that it has made the test clearer by demonstrating
the type of extraordinary occasion that must exist before there can be a

3.
The reasoning of the Ontario Superior Court in Gates v. Standard,[2004] O.J. No. 1470 (Sup.
Ct.) (QL) appeared to involve a balancing of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation
at the qualified privilege stage of the analysis. Under the heading of "Qualified Privilege," the court
concluded at paragraph 63 that "in the balancing exercise, the Charter value of freedom of expression
is to be given no more weight in principle than the protection of the reputation of the individual."
4.
While qualified privilege applies equally to occasions in which there are public duties or private
interests to discharge, this comment focuses primarily on public duties, as this was the basis of the
analysis in Campbell v. Jones.
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public duty to make a communication that may defame a reputation before
the "world at large."
I. Qualifiedprivilege:a background
History and basic elements
Qualified privilege is one of three defences available to a party defending
an action against defamation. For reasons exogenous to our purposes
here, it is usually deployed when the other defences of justification and
fair comment are unavailable or have not succeeded.' Qualified privilege
recognizes that there are occasions in which a party will have a compelling
legal, social, or moral duty to make a communication. On such occasions,
the common law recognizes a limited immunity from actions for defamation
even though the communication made is defamatory.
Defamation was described in the Nova Scotia arbitral decision of ABT
Building Products Canada v. C.E.P, Local 434:6
A publication is defamatory if it lowers the reputation of the plaintiff

in the estimation of persons in a substantial segment of the community,
that is, if it has the tendency to or does injure, prejudice or disparage
the plaintiff in the eyes of others, or lowers the good opinion, esteem

or regard which others have for him, or causes him to be shunned and
avoided, or exposes him to hatred, contempt or ridicule.
When determining whether a person has been defamed, the court does not
consider the reputation that the defamed person wishes she had, but the
reputation she actually had.7
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for defamation must establish
three elements: that the impugned words were defamatory, that the words
referred to the plaintiff, and that the words were published to a third person.8
If a court finds that these three elements are present, there is a finding

5.
The defence of justification is met when the defendant can demonstrate on a balance of
probabilities that her communication to a third party was in fact truthful; for more please see: Matthews
v. MacMillan, [2003] N.S.J. No. 319 (S.C.) (QL). The defence of fair comment is made out when the
defendant can establish on a balance of probabilities that the communication was one of comment and
not of fact. The defendant must also establish that the comment was made honestly and in good faith
on a matter of public interest and that the comment was not made maliciously. The comment must be
an honest expression of opinion on true facts which are known to the person making the comment. For
more, see: Raymond E. Brown, The Law of Defamation In Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994)
vol. 1 at 1-35 [Brown v. 1].
6.
(2000), 90 L.A.C. (4th) I at 37 (N.S.). The quote was cited with approval in Brown v. 1, supra
note 5 at 4-3.
7.
Raymond E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada,2 "d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) vol. 4
at 4-3 [Brown v. 4].
8.
Leenen v. CanadianBroadcastingCorporation(2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 656 [Leenen]; Airline Seat
Co. v. 1396804 Ontario, Inc. (2000), O.J. No. 2586 (S.C.J.).
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of defamation, and the question then becomes whether the defendant can
successfully establish one of the three defences to defamation.
The basic elements of the test to establish qualified privilege have
remained essentially unchanged since the Supreme Court adopted the
House of Lords decision Adam v. Ward 9 in its decision Halls v. Mitchell,"0
although the test has been refined by subsequent Canadian case law. In
order to establish the existence of qualified privilege, firstly, a defendant
must have made a communication in order to discharge a private interest or
a public duty. Secondly, the defendant must have made the communication
to a party with a corresponding interest in receiving the communication.
Thirdly, the communication must not have been made with actual or
express malice. Fourthly, the communication must not have exceeded the
scope of the privilege recognized by the court. This test must be met on
the balance of probabilities. "
It is well established that the privilege attaches to the occasion and not
to the communication or to the party making the communication. 2 The
justification for the privilege can be traced back to the 1834 decision of
Toogoodv. Spyring 3 in which Baron Parke reasoned: "Iffairly warranted by
any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such (privileged)
communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare
of society.' 1 4 In the words of Professor Raymond E.Brown:
the law recognizes that it is in the public interest that on occasion
persons should be able to receive frank and uninhibited information from
particular sources. The purpose of the immunity is not so much to shield
the parties involved as it is to promote the public welfare. 5

9.
[1917] A.C. 309 (H.L.) [Adam].
10. [1928] S.C.R. 125 [Halls].
11. There is a second branch of qualified privilege which is based upon good faith reporting of
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, but that is beyond the scope of this comment.
12. Adam, supra note 9 at 328, and further at 348, when Lord Shaw found: "[Privilege] is a term
which is applied in two senses. There is a privileged occasion, and there is said to be a privileged
communication. The former is correct; the latter, strictly viewed, tends to error. What is meant with
regard to a privileged communication is that it was protected as being within the scope of the privilege
attaching to the occasion. The occasion is privileged, the communication is protected." Halls, supra
note 10; in Botiuk v. Toronto FreePressPublications,Ltd. (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4") 609 (S.C.C.)at 626,
Cory J.said: "Qualified privilege attaches to the occasion upon which the communication is made, and
not to the communication itself." In Lee v Globe andMail (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 652 (S.C.J.) at 657,
Swinton J. noted: "Qualified privilege attaches to the occasion on which words were published, rather
than to the words themselves or the parties."
13. (1834), 149 E.R. 1044 at 1050.
14. For a more detailed discussion of the justification for qualified privilege, see Raymond E. Brown,
The Law of Defamation in Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) vol. 2 at 13-9.
15. Ibid.at 13-11.
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In 2002, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the public interest
should not be viewed "technically or narrowly," and might be personal,
6
social, business, financial, or legal in nature. "The context is important."'
In Halls, the Supreme Court found that a subjective belief in a public duty
was not enough to establish the privilege, but that the belief had to be
reasonable and based upon the standards of people of ordinary intelligence
and moral principles. 7
It is the importance ofthe occasion and the duty to make a communication
that defines the scope of the privilege that will be recognized. The law
is clear that the communication itself must have regard to all of the
circumstances of the case and to the nature of the corresponding interests
of the recipient of the communication. 8 If the occasion warrants, the
courts will tolerate broad scope for the language that has been used as
long as the communicator honestly and upon reasonable grounds believed
that what she said was true even though it was not. In Adam v. Ward, Lord
Atkinson said that persons communicating on a privileged occasion were
not restricted to the use of such language merely as is reasonably
necessary to protect the interest or discharge the duty.... He will be
protected even though his language should be violent or excessively
strong, if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he might
honestly and on reasonable grounds believed that what he wrote or said
was true and necessary for the purpose of his vindication, though in fact
this was not so. 9
Even given the broad scope afforded by this interpretation, it is the
"circumstances" of the occasion that define the grounds upon which
a speech is protected. The Ontario Court of Appeal has confirmed this
test, but added that "reckless disregard for the truth" would be considered
malice and thus would negate the defence at the third part of the test.
The venerable English text Gatley on Libel and Slander has often been
quoted approvingly and widely in both English and Canadian cases for its
position that privileged speech could be "harsh, hasty, untrue, or libellous"
as long as it is justified by the circumstances of the case and by the public
20
interest.

16. RTC EngineeringConsultants Ltd., v. Ontario(Ministry of the SolicitorGeneral & Correctional
Services - Office of the FireMarshall), [2002] O.J. No. 1001 (Ont. C.A.) (QL) [RTC Engineering].
17. Halls, supra note 10 at para. 12.
18. Adam, supra note 9; Hill v. Church of Scientology (1995), 126 D.L.R. ( 4th) 129 (S.C.C.); Jones
v. Bennett, [1969] S.C.R. 277; McLoughlin v. Kutasy, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 311.
19. Adam, supra note 9 at 339.
20. Gatley on Libel and Slander, 91h ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at para. 14.2 [Gatley].
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Two Court of Appeal decisions from western Canada may have
narrowed this test somewhat. In Moises v. Canadian Newspaper,2 ' the
British Columbia Court of Appeal followed a much earlier decision of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal,22 and found that the timing and urgency
of the communication had to be taken into account, as well as whether
or not the statement was officiously volunteered, and whether or not the
statements were germane and reasonably appropriate to the occasion.
Moises also confirmed that the categories of occasions in which the
courts can recognize that persons have a public duty or a private interest in
making a communication are never closed. 23 Some examples of occasions
in which courts have found qualified privilege involve the following:
the report of a private investigator to a client, a parent's report to school
officials about a teacher's alleged maltreatment of a child, a report
of a father with respect to his son's failing grades, a report to directors
concerning an auditor's misconduct, a report to a lending institution
concerning an applicant for a loan, and a report to a union about the firing
of an employee.24
When a court finds an occasion of qualified privilege, the legal effect
of this is to rebut the presumption of malice that otherwise accompanies
the publication of defamatory words. 25 The occasion of privilege displaces
the presumption of malice until the plaintiff can demonstrate on a balance
of probabilities that the communication was made with malice. 26 The
existence of privilege, however, does not change the actionable character
27
of the words.
Qualifiedprivilege & defamatory comments made to the "world at
large"
For years, the 1968 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Jones v.
Bennett28 was understood to tightly circumscribe the conditions upon
which qualified privilege would be recognized in relation to a defamatory
communication made to the general public. This case established that the
appropriateness of the audience to whom a communication is made is an
important factor in determining whether the communication exceeds the
scope of the privilege recognized.

21. Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co. (1996), 30 C.C.L.T. (2d) 145 (B.C. C.A.) [Moises].
22. Sapiro v. Leader PublishingCo., [1926] 2 W.W.R. 268 at 271 (Sask. C.A.) [Sapiro].
23. Moises, supranote 21 at para. 18.
24. Sapiro, supra note 22.
25. Simmons v. Murphy (1996), 137 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 332 at 341 (PEA. T.D.).
26. Shaw v. Morgan (1888), 15 R. 865 at 870 (Ct. of Sess.).
27. Campbell v. Cartmell, [1999] O.J. No. 3553 (Ont. S.C.J.) (QL).
28. Jones, supra note 18.
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In Jones, the defendant Premier of British Columbia had led a
successful effort to pass legislation to remove the chairman of the Purchasing
Commission. The provincial government justified the legislation on the
basis of allegations that the chairman had improperly accepted benefits
while on the job. 29 At a party gathering closely following the passing of
the legislation, the Premier commented to two reporters that: "I'm not
going to talk about the Jones boy (the chairman). I could say a lot, but
let me assure you of this; the position taken by the government is the
right one." In actual fact, however, the commission chairman had been
acquitted of criminal charges of wrongdoing over two months before the
Premier made his public remarks, and the Attorney-General's subsequent
appeal of that decision was struck out as "frivolous and vexatious" over
six weeks before the comments.
At trial, the court found the existence of defamation, but that decision
was over-turned by the Court of Appeal. At the Supreme Court level, a
unanimous court held that the appropriateness of an audience is a critical
factor in helping a court determine whether the corresponding interest of
the recipient of the communication was met appropriately. The court went
on to find that the Premier had knowingly made his remarks to the general
public,3" and that the general public was an inappropriately broad audience
to have had the requisite corresponding interest in receiving information
about the alleged misconduct of a single civil servant. On this basis, the
court restored the finding of the trial judge.
The court did not altogether close the door to recognizing an occasion
of qualified privilege when remarks are made to the general public. For the
court, Chief Justice Cartwright recognized the continued persuasiveness of
the old English House of Lords case Adam v. Ward, which was a decision
that recognized qualified privilege notwithstanding that defamatory
remarks were published to the general public. In Adam, the defendant
was entitled to comment to the general public because the initial "maker
of the charge" had first published his statements to the general public.
Therefore, in that case, the recipient third party audience maintained a
corresponding interest in receiving the defendant's communication, even
though the communication turned out to be defamatory.
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that politicians making
out-of-legislature statements on their stewardship of government always do
so on occasions of qualified privilege, and held that there was no authority

29. Comments made in provincial legislatures and federal parliament are protected by absolute
privilege.
30. It was held that the Premier's knowledge of the presence of two news reporters meant that he
knew his comments would be communicated to the general public.
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for such privilege.3' This is consistent with the traditional application
of qualified privilege, which attaches itself to occasions and not to the
communications or to the communicators.
In Parlett v. Robinson,32 a politician was successful in raising the
defence of qualified privilege concerning defamatory remarks he made to
the "world at large." The defendant Member of Parliament was the official
spokesperson of his party on the Ministry of the Solicitor General and was
also a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice
and Legal Affairs. In the course of his constituency work, the Member
came across information that the plaintiff may have been involved in a
scheme to sell violin chin rests constructed by prison labour at markedup rates for profit in the private sector. The Member then diligently took
steps to find out additional information from the business, the community,
and appropriate government channels. In his meetings with government
officials, the defendant Member refused to name names. Eventually, the
defendant discovered that the plaintiff had in fact made attempts to sell the
chin rests for profit, and the defendant then disclosed this to the Solicitor
General and demanded an inquiry. When the Solicitor General refused, the
defendant went public with a press conference in which some defamatory
comments were made.
The Court of Appeal held that the defamatory remarks were made on
an occasion of qualified privilege because the defendant had honestly and
upon reasonable grounds believed the comments he had made. Further, the
court recognized that the defendant had taken many steps to try to deal with
the situation through internal government channels, and only published his
remarks to the general public when his efforts were ultimately frustrated.
The electorate had a "bona fide interest" in knowing of the matter, and
so the decision was consistent with the legal test set out by Jones in the
31. There is some authority for the proposition that a candidate for public office speaking to voters
speaks on occasions of qualified privilege, but this proposition has also been contested. In Globe &
Mail v. Boland (1960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 277 at 281-282, it was held that comments made about the
fitness of candidates for office during an election were not necessarily made on occasions of qualified
privilege, as this would be "harmful to that 'common convenience and welfare of society"'. In Globe
& Mail, the Supreme Court relied upon the English text Gatleyon Libel and Slander,4 1 ed., by Richard
O'Sullivan (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1953) at 254, and cited the author's following comments:
"[Such a privilege] would tend to deter sensitive and honourable men from seeking public positions
of trust and responsibility, and leave them open to others who have no respect for reputation." This
case and text were cited approvingly in Hill v. Church of Scientology, supra note 18, which also cited
the following cases: Derrickson v. Tomat (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4 h) 401 at 408; Westbank Band of Indians
v. Tomat (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 396 (B.C.C.A.). See also Douglas v. Tucker, [1952] 1 D.L.R. 657
(S.C.C.). Nevertheless, in Jones, the Supreme Court found that even if candidates for public office did
speak on occasions of qualified privilege, it would be an "unwarranted extension" of such a privilege
to expand it to include the protection of all out-of-legislature accounts of government stewardship
given by politicians not in the process of contesting elections.
32. [1986] B.C.J. No. 594 (C.A.) (QL).
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Court's finding. The court expressly distinguished the facts of Jones on the
grounds that the defendant in that case had had no occasion for a duty to
communicate to the "world at large."33
The court cited two English cases involving politicians receiving or
repeating defamatory communications while in the course of their duties
as Members of Parliament. 3 While neither case involved publication
to the "world at large," they both involved the duties of politicians to
make communications which proved to be defamatory. In both cases,
the Members of Parliament dealt with complaints fielded from their
constituents by writing letters to the appropriate government persons
requesting investigations into alleged misconduct. Both cases were held to
be occasions of qualified privilege. In Beech, Geoffrey Lane J. reasoned:
It will be a sad day when a Member of Parliament has to look over his
shoulder before ventilating, to the proper authority, criticisms about the
work of a public servant or a professional man who is holding himself
out in practice for the benefit of the public which he honestly believes to
merit investigation.35
In summary, occasions of qualified privilege may arise in the course
of politicians carrying out their responsibilities as elected officials, but
the fact that a politician is making a communication does not mean that
she is doing so on an occasion of qualified privilege. The existence of an
occasion of qualified privilege will always be fact-driven and depend upon
36
the circumstances of the occasion.
Scope of the occasion ofpublic duty: communicatordoes not have
to actually advance the public interest in order to establish qualified
privilege
There is some danger that the law may become confused on the proper
scope of the occasion for public duty, and so I shall deal briefly with
this issue before advancing to the impact of Hill and Campbell upon the
defence of qualified privilege. In the 2000 decision of Leenen v. Canadian
BroadcastingCorporation,37 the Ontario Superior Court mistakenly stated

33. Parlett,supra note 32 at para. 35.
34. Rex v. Rule, [1937] 2 K.B. 375; Beech v. Freeson, [1972] lQ.B. 14.
35. Beech, supra note 34 at 24.
36. Other Canadian cases where courts have found occasion for qualified privilege for
communications made to broad audiences include Stopforth v. Goyer (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 369 (Ont.
C.A.); Camporesev. Parton (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (B.C. S.C.); Baumann v. Turner(1993), 105
D.L.R. (4-) 37 (B.C. C.A.); B.S.0.1.W., Local 97 v. Campbell(1997), 152 D.L.R. (4"') 547 (B.C. S.C.);
Silva v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4"') 554 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
37. (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 656 (Sup. Ct.).
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the law on the scope of qualified privilege, and the decision was upheld on
appeal in 2001 (the decision appeared correct on the facts). 3
In Leenen, the trial court found that there was no occasion of qualified
privilege where the defendants had broadcast a documentary containing
many untrue facts and innuendo. Contrary information was readily
available to the defendants, said the court. In other words, the belief of
the C.B.C. journalists in the veracity of the information propounded in
the documentary was not reasonably held. However, the court went on
to find:
This broadcast had a major impact on patients, some ofwhom stopped their
medications independent of their physicians' advice. Many physicians
and patients were greatly inconvenienced due to the extra clinic visits
and the additional counselling that was necessary in the aftermath of the
fifth estate broadcast. In fact, I think it reasonably could be said that the
program was contrary to the public interest because of its real potential
for harm by inciting panic amongst patients suffering from high blood
pressure.... I have concluded that this broadcast seriously undermined
trust and confidence in Canada's health care system. To suggest that
the [Health Protection Branch] was less than diligent, something I have
concluded was simply not true, in the mind of a reasonable viewer would
create grave concern about the drug regulatory process. Hence, the
defence of qualified privilege, on this basis alone, fails.39
40
With due deference to the court, there is no authority for this finding.
The fact that a court must establish that there is a public duty or a private
interest to be discharged does not mean that the court must also judge
whether the content of the communication actually meets the public interest.
The result in Leenen seems to suggest that there is a duty upon broadcasters
to instil confidence in the public health care system! Even if the strictest
case law emanating from Moises and Sapiro is correct, the statements
need only be germane and reasonably appropriate to the occasion. Indeed,
there may be occasion for qualified privilege in statements that are "harsh,
hasty, untrue, and libellous" as long as there is no "reckless disregard for
the truth." To suggest also that the defendant has to advance the public
interest is simply inconsistent with the existing law.
In the Law of Defamation in Canada, Professor Brown critiqued the
finding of the trial judge in Leenen:

The defence of qualified privilege would be seriously eroded if courts
were to examine not only whether the subject matter ofthe communication
gives rise to a privileged occasion but they were to evaluate the efficacy
38.
39.
40.

(2001), 6 C.C.L.T. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.).
Leenen, supra note 8 at 697.
Brown v. 4, supra note 6 at 13-13 at footnote 35.
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of its content on the public to whom it is communicated. If courts were
permitted to examine its content for other than purposes of deciding
whether the defendant acted maliciously or the plaintiff suffered serious
injury, they would be placing themselves in the position of moral and
social guardians of the nation's beliefs and ideas. Nor should they stand
as arbiters
of what is good or bad or right or wrong for the nation's
41
public.
III. The Impact of "Charter Values" and Campbell v. Jones
Defamation law in general: balancingfreedom of expression with injury
of reputation
The 1995 decision in Hill v. Church of Scientology42 was the first
opportunity the Supreme Court had to address the novel argument that
the tort of defamation had to be re-evaluated in light of the advent of the
Charter of Rights andFreedoms, in order to take an expanded account of
"Chartervalues" such as freedom of expression.
The defendant organization raising the novel argument of "Charter
values" was an unsympathetic one. The Court held that the defendant
had maliciously continued to publicly attack and pursue charges against
a Crown prosecutor for improperly using sealed documents in an
investigation-even when the defendant knew that not to be true. The court
eventually found that the defendant organization had kept a file labelled
"Enemy Canada" on the prosecutor from 1977 until at least 1981. For
various reasons, the Supreme Court rejected the defences of justification,
fair comment, and qualified privilege, and upheld the award of a large sum
of damages.
On the issue of having to re-evaluate defamation law in light of the
advent of "Chartervalues," the Supreme Court concluded that the common
law of defamation complies with the underlying values of the Charterand
held that there is no need to amend or alter it. 43 In the decision, Justice Cory
observed that "[tjhere can be no doubt that in libel cases the twin values
of reputation and freedom of expression will clash."" The Supreme Court
recognized that both reputation and freedom of expression were worth
protecting in a free and democratic society, and noted that "defamatory
statements are very tenuously related to the core values which underlie s.
2(b). 45 Justice Cory also declared that:

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid. at 13-13, footnote 35.
Hill,supra note 18.
Ibid. at 170.
Ibid. at 158.
Ibid. at 159.
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[defamatory statements] are inimical to the search for truth. False and
injurious statements cannot enhance self-development. Nor can it
ever be said that they lead to healthy participation in the affairs of the
community. Indeed, they are detrimental to the advancement of these
46
values and harmful to the interests of a free and democratic society.

For our purposes, it is critical to be aware that the Supreme Court engaged
in the balancing of the "twin values" of freedom of expression and the
protection of reputation in the context of defamation law generally-and
not in the context of qualified privilege.
Qualifiedprivilege: it is the occasion ofpublic duty that matters-not
freedom of speech
Campbellv. Jones had a powerful impact upon the law of qualified privilege
because it demonstrated that all things flow from the occasion ofpublic duty.
While the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal did not "loosen" the test earlier
set out by the Supreme Court in Jones, it did recognize an extraordinary
occasion in which parties had a public duty to make a communication
to the "world at large"-even though parts of the communication were
defamatory. In other words, the Court did not make the test easier, but it
did make it clearer.
This advance in the case law would not have been possible had the
Court focused its reasoning on the balancing of freedom of expression
with the protection of reputation from defamation. While Roscoe J.A. did
make some concluding remarks which hinted that qualified privilege would
have to be re-fabricated to take an expanded account of "Chartervalues"
such as freedom of expression, when her decision is viewed in the totality
of its reasoning, it is pretty clear that the defendants spoke on an occasion
of extraordinary circumstance involving a compelling and immediate
public interest. Absent this occasion, the defamatory comments made in
the case would not have been protected by qualified privilege regardless of
the Charter. However, because the Court of Appeal did not expressly shut
the door to the "Charter values" position-thus missing out on the finding
of the Supreme Court in Hill-it is still necessary to observe that the law of
qualified privilege has not been properly settled by the courts.
On the facts, Campbell involved an occasion of compelling public
duties owed not only to the immediate parties involved, but to the broader
community at large. It will be recalled that three twelve-year-old black
girls at a Halifax elementary school were subjected to a very invasive
personal search by a police officer, in front of each other and in view of
the windows of the school halls to which other students had access. This
46.

Ibid. at 158.
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invasive personal search-which was a strip search according to the test
later set out in R. v. Goldena7-was conducted without any connection to
an arrest. The three girls were not informed of their right to counsel or of
their right to refuse to be searched. The parents and guardian of the three
girls were not contacted. In fact, the police officer involved admitted that
the search was unconstitutional even before the action made it to court.
Most strikingly, the egregious rights violations occurred over a single tendollar bill.
Media leaks of the rights violations quickly set off a storm in the
Halifax community. Soon after the media leaks, two human rights
lawyers were hired to help the girls and their families lodge a complaint
with the Halifax Police Department. Immediately after the complaint was
filed, the defendant lawyers held a press conference in which one stated
that "there's no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this would not have
happened to white children... I do believe that class has a lot to do with
this issue also."48 The other defendant opined that "this incident would not
have occurred so perhaps 'naturally' in a different neighbourhood with a
different socio-economic and racial mix."4 9
The massive and multiple violations of the constitutional rights of
the three girls occurred in a community notoriously beset by a plague
of systemic racism. Details of the illegal search surfaced in the media
twenty-seven days before the lawyers hired by the girls' parents held their
press conference. In fact, the illegal search began making headlines across
Halifax even before the defendant lawyers were contacted by the girls'
parents. The feeling in the black community was that the illegal search
was not just a simple error or oversight, but a massive departure from the
standard of care typical for other communities." That the black community
was subjected to massive departures from the standard of care more
frequently than other communities in Nova Scotia was well documented.
In the thirty years prior to Campbell, the province had published four
government reports on the existence of systemic discrimination in the
justice and education systems: the Graham Commission in 1974, the Royal
Commission on the Donald Marshall Prosecution in 1989, the Report of the
Nova Scotia Advisory Group on Race Relations in 199 1, and the B.L.A.C.
47. R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679.
48. Campbell, supranote I at para. 15.
49. Ibid. at para. 14.
50. The online version of the Halifax newspaper The Coast recognized Black History Month in 2004
with a special section that listed a series of racial incidents occurring in Nova Scotia dating back to
1984. In 2001, the initial defamation settlement in favour of the Halifax police officer in Campbell
was the only listed event (as was the over turning of the trial court decision by the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal in 2002). For more, see: Lezlie Lowe, "Dark Days" The Coast (19-26 February 2004),
online: Coast Classics <www.coastclassic.ca/issues/190204/feature.html>.
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Report on Education in 1994. In 1998, famed Canadian Olympic boxer
Kirk Johnson-also black-was wrongfully arrested and his car impounded
in an incident ultimately found to constitute discrimination on the part of
the police. This prompted the appointment of a Board of Inquiry under the
provincial Human Rights Act, and ultimately, the Board ended up making
yet more recommendations for changes to the training of Halifax police
officers."
Soon after the police officer was named in the press conference, the
police officer brought an action for defamation on the grounds that the
search did not go as far as was claimed in the press conference, and on the
grounds that the press conference carried the innuendo that the officer had
discriminated on the grounds of race, economic, and social status.
In ruling on the issue, the Court of Appeal held that the circumstances
of the occasion warranted a finding of qualified privilege. It overturned the
decision of the trial court, which had held otherwise, based on the multiple
grounds that the trial judge had applied too narrow a test in assessing the
circumstances,52 had failed to consider adequately the professional and
ethical responsibilities of lawyers to speak out on the shortcomings of
the justice system, had over-emphasized the timing of the publication
as a factor to be considered, and had failed to take account of "Charter
values." This comment notes that three out of the four factors listed pertain
to occasions of public duty, while the last comes close to being an error
in law due to its inconsistency with Hill and the traditional principles of
qualified privilege. Perhaps a portion of this shortcoming can be explained
by the fact that the occasion arose in part because of the grievous nature
of the Charter violations that occurred during the illegal strip search.
In other words, "Charter values" played a role because of the occasion
of duty-not principally or significantly due to freedom of expression.
Unfortunately, this position may be difficult to sustain in light of some of
the closing language of Campbell. However, the extent to which freedom
of expression did play a role in the decision in Campbell, is the extent to
which, strictly speaking, the decision fell off-side the traditional principles
of qualified privilege. I believe that this distinction is an important one for
reasons to be discussed below.
The language of Campbell speaks overwhelmingly to the extraordinary
occasion of public duty that arose on its particular facts. Prior to Campbell,
Canadian courts had been reluctant to find occasions of qualified privilege
when communications were made to the "world at large" about non5 1. <www.gov.ns.ca/humanrights/decisions/2003decisions.htm>.
52. The trial judge had denied qualified privilege based on the fact that there was at that time no need
to issue broad public comment on the quasi-judicial proceedings that were then in motion.
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judicial proceedings. When the courts did so, such communications tended
to have been made by or in relation to politicians, government officials, or
other public figures. This confused some into believing that the privilege
extended to such figures on the basis of their status, even though such
arguments were expressly rejected in Jones and Hill. Indeed, this type
of erroneous reasoning even showed up in the dissent in Campbell: "I do
not think it insignificant that the judgment (in the English case Reynolds,
which found in favour of qualified privilege) concerned press publications
about politicians; whereas, both Hill and this case concern the publication
of statements made by members of the bar about public officials who were
not politicians."53 The majority in Campbell made it clear that it was not
the status of persons charged with the occasion of public duty that mattered,
but rather the circumstances of the occasion that drove recognition of the
privilege:
While I agree that not all public statements made by a lawyer are clothed
in privilege upon merely the invocation of the duty to improve the
administration of justice, a lawyer faced with a patent injustice, such as
the violation of her clients' Charterrights by law enforcement officers,
has a substantial and compelling duty to ensure such injustice is remedied
in an effective and timely manner. 4
Over and over again, the majority in Campbell discussed the fact that the
trial court had not sufficiently understood the nature or gravity of the rights
violations that occurred. It was this gravity that gave rise to the occasion
of qualified privilege. The special relationship of the lawyers in this case
to the violations, to the justice system, and to the community gave them
a particular public duty to comment to the world at large about the nature
of the violations that had occurred. The ethical obligation of lawyers to
speak out on occasions of injustice was documented in the "Legal Ethics
and Professional Conduct" chapter of A Handbookfor Lawyers in Nova
Scotia.5 5
The unique fact situation of Campbell gave the court an opportunity
to clarify the law on qualified privilege, and for the most part, the Court
of Appeal was successful in doing so. The backdrop of systemic rights
violations of the very type committed by the plaintiff was one of the unusual
features of Campbell, because the case created an occasion for duty that
was critical to the immediate parties and yet crucial to the community at
large. Another uncommon feature of the case is that allegations of the
53. Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 101.
54. Campbell, supra note Iat para. 56.
55. A Handbookfor Lawyers in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 1990) ch. 21
at 93.
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illegal strip search had already been published to the "world at large" even
prior to the retaining of the defendants. This meant that the "world at
large" had a corresponding interest in the issue even before the defamatory
comments were made by the defendants. Combined, these factors created
an occasion of public duty that was compelling, timely, and urgent. For
obvious reasons, it would have rendered the purpose of the privilege
nugatory to have required the defendants to wait for the outcome of the
trial itself before addressing the public furor that had been created by
yet another incident of systemic discrimination. In the absence of some
of these facts, the case would not have been appropriate for qualified
privilege, regardless of freedom of expression.
In the concluding paragraphs of the decision, the majority appeared
uncertain as to whether it had appropriately addressed the test set out by
the Supreme Court in Jones in 1968. Perhaps this is why Roscoe J.A. went
beyond merely attempting to distinguish Jones on the facts, and went so
far as to suggest that perhaps the law was changing as well:
it is important to bear in mind that the Jones v. Bennett decision predated the Charterby over 12 years ... 56 Here, there was an intertwining
of Charterrights: the right to counsel and the right not to be subjected
to an unreasonable search, with Chartervalues: freedom of speech and
equality rights. Freedom of speech was being exercised to promote
equality rights and to draw attention to violations of Charter rights ......
I would conclude that in all the circumstances of this case, observed
with "today's eyes", in today's social conditions, that it is in the public
interest that the press conference be found to be an occasion of qualified
privilege. 8
This comment suggests that the reason that Nova Scotia had been the
site of government reports on systemic racism as far back as 1974 is that
even with "dated eyes," that type of rights violation was unacceptable. It
is further submitted that on the facts alone, Campbell meets the test set
out by the Supreme Court in Jones. In other words, had the same rights
violations occurred in 1981, the violations and the broader community
interest would have been sufficient to trigger an occasion of public duty
based on the law set out in Jones and in earlier cases.
The facts in Jones involved allegations of misconduct by a single civil
servant. Prior to the publication of the defamatory comments, the media
had not widely commented on the issue in Jones, and so there was no
requisite corresponding interest of a recipient audience in the case. Two

56.
57.
58.

Campbell, supra note I at para. 67.
Ibid. at para. 68.
Ibid.atpara.71.
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months before the defamatory comments had been made, the defendant
had to have been aware that the plaintiff had been cleared of criminal
wrongdoing. Roughly six weeks before the defamatory comments had
been made, the defendant had to have been aware that the attorney-general's
action against the plaintiff had been struck out as "frivolous and vexatious."
Suffice to say, there was no systemic issue of "kickbacks" involving the
broader public sector or the communities of British Columbia.
Notwithstanding the moments of uncertainty likely experienced by the
majority in Campbell in the concluding remarks of the case, the judgment
was extremely sound overall and constituted a major advance in the case
law. The Court of Appeal did not make it easier to overcome the test set
by Jones v. Bennett, but clearly demonstrated the type of extraordinary
occasion of public duty to make a communication to the world at large.
It is submitted that the proper reading of Campbell is in the totality of its
reasoning, shorn of its brief moment of Chartertriumphalism.
The argument that defamation law needs to be amended or altered in
light of the advent of "Charter values" has been all but put to rest by the
Supreme Court in Hill: "In conclusion, in its application to the parties in
this action, the common law of defamation complies with the underlying
values of the Charter and there is no need to amend or alter it."59 The
court found that reputation was "closely related to the innate worthiness
and dignity of the individual." Reputation therefore was to be balanced
with freedom of expression at the defamation stage of the analysis. 60
Primafacie, reputation and freedom of expression are "twin values" of
equal weight, and reputation cannot be trampled upon in the name of the
Charter.
The result in Campbell does not conflict with this principle. What
Campbell has done is demonstrate the type of extraordinary occasion that
59. Hill, supra note 18 at 170. 1 am indebted to my peer reviewer at Dalhousie Law Journalfor
pointing out that the immediately foregoing comment is dicta to the extent that it applies to "Charter
values" other than freedom of expression. In this connection, my peer reviewer posits that Hill v.
Scientology has not closed the door entirely to the application of other "Charter values," such as
equality, to defamation law. Strictly speaking, this assessment is correct, but the Supreme Court dicta
are highly persuasive when considered in the context of the delicate labyrinth of tests that circumscribe
the defence of qualified privilege. For example, could the principle of equality possibly mean reduced
emphasis on a communicator's "honestly and reasonably held belief" in the truth of a defamatory
statement? Should defamatory statements no longer have to be germane or reasonably appropriate
to an urgent occasion? Surely even the most compelling affirmation of equality cannot carry with it
the right to defame an individual reputation with impunity. While in technical terms the principle of
equality could be applied to expand juridical readings of urgent occasions at the qualified privilege
stage of the analysis (unlike freedom of expression), it would be extraordinarily bad policy to permit
such an application to overwhelm the traditional tests of the privilege. Moreover, Campbell v. Jones
supports the proposition that such an application is unnecessary-even though the Court of Appeal
failed to make this clear in its decision.
60. Hill, supra note 18 at 160.
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must exist before a party will have a public duty to make a communication
to the "world at large" that may damage a reputation. It is the occasion and
not the communication to which the privilege is attracted. Put differently,
it is only the occasion that may tilt the balance in favour of public duty
over reputation-not the general freedom of expression.61
This view is consistent with the finding of the House of Lords in
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers62-a decision which has been frequently
mentioned and canvassed in Canadian defamation cases. In the decision,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead reasoned: "When the interest is of sufficient
importance to outweigh the need to protect reputation, the occasion
is regarded as privileged."6 3 Consistent with Hill, the House of Lords
decision indicates that it is the narrow occasion of public duty that attracts
privilege, not the blunt edge of the general freedom of expression.
It is contended that on questions of qualified privilege, the approach
that balances the occasion of public duty with the protection of reputation is
the logical and correct interpretation of the law. Freedom of expression is
the individual right of all human beings. It does not spring from particular
occasions of public duty, nor allow for only limited pockets in which
communication may take place. Freedom of expression does not need a
justification-qualified privilege does. Qualified privilege is engaged when
the right to freedom of expression has been exceeded and the reputation of
an individual has been damaged.
Freedom of expression bears only indirect relation to the doctrine
of qualified privilege, and as such, any analysis that includes it as the
primary factor to be weighed against the reputation of the individual will
necessarily be overly broad and sloppy. Qualified privilege is attracted
to specific occasions of public duties that may only be discharged by
parties appropriately placed to discharge such duties. On extraordinary
occasions, only specific parties will be appropriately positioned to deliver
valuable comment to the "world at large" about occurrences that engage
the public interest.
The Supreme Court has already been clear that broad Charter
rights, including freedom of expression, do not primafacie outweigh the
protection of the reputation of the individual. If the makers of subsequent
court analysis of qualified privilege should carelessly fall into the habit
of resting the justification for the privilege upon the shoulders of the

61. It is important to note as well that the fact that a plaintiff does not establish defamation does not
mean that she will be without remedy if a remark is discovered to be untrue. The courts could order a
retraction of or an apology for an untrue statement without finding for damages due to defamation.
62. [1999] H.L.J. No. 45 (H.L.) (QL).
63. Ibid. at para. 10.
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general freedom of expression-in the increased absence of reasoned
analysis focused on specific occasions and duties-then inevitably the
courts will become less sensitive to the particular circumstances of duty
and become less tolerant of unqualified intrusions upon reputation. In
such circumstances, the doctrine will be whittled away by the courts, and it
will become vastly more difficult to carry out one's public responsibilities.
The loss would be substantial. Defamatory statements may be tenuously
related to the core values of freedom of speech, but on specific occasions,
they may be fundamental to the search for truth.
Conclusion
Read in the totality of its reasoning and notwithstanding its fleeting
moments of uncertainty about the potential impact of "Charter values,"
Campbellv. Jones is a clear advance in the case law because it demonstrates
an extraordinary set of facts which founded an occasion of public duty for
select persons to communicate to the public at large. The unique set of
facts in Campbell gave the justices of the Court of Appeal the opportunity
to clarify areas of the doctrine of qualified privilege which had not been
sufficiently engaged before. The brief moments of uncertainty expressed
by the judges in their concluding remarks-when they appeared to wonder
whether it was enough to distinguish Jones v. Bennett on the facts alonedo not detract from the overall strength of the decision. However, the
musings about the impact of "Chartervalues" did leave a bit of room for
interpretation. Accordingly, it is hoped that the foregoing analysis has
made a compelling case for interpreting Campbell along the lines of the
traditional principles of qualified privilege. The contrary interpretationfocussed broadly upon the freedom of expression and not upon occasions
of duty-could lead to the absence of reasoned analysis focused on specific
occasions of public duty and that could whittle away the defence of qualified
privilege. The Supreme Court has said that freedom of expression does
not encompass the right to defame an individual's reputation, and as such,
the Charterdoes not provide a justification for unqualified intrusions upon
reputation. Justification for such an intrusion must be established by the
occasion of public duty.
It is concluded, firstly, that qualified privilege attaches to particular
occasions of public duty or private interest, and that when the defence
of qualified privilege is raised, it is properly the occasion that must be
weighed against individual reputation. Secondly, the advent of "Charter
values" such as freedom of expression has not made it "easier" to defame a
reputation, and so do not provide ajustification for re-fabricating defamation
law or the defence of qualified privilege. Thirdly, when Campbell is read
in the totality of its analysis and denuded of the uncertainty expressed in
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the concluding remarks of the decision, it is clear that the case has not
"loosened the test" earlier set out by the Supreme Court in Jones. Rather,
the premier contribution of Campbell is that it has clarified exactly which
type of extraordinary circumstance will found an occasion of public duty
to make a communication to the general public.

